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On December 1, 1976, the Electric Boat division of General Dy-
namics submitted to the United States Navy a contract claim for
more than $500 million arising from a $2.7 billion contract for 18
Los Angeles class SSN-688 attack submarines. The claim alleged
that the payments General Dynamics had received from the Navy
under its fixed-price contract were insufficient to cover its actual
costs of production. When the claim was settled in 1978, General
Dynamics had received cash, tax, and interest benefits worth almost
$1 billion.'
The 1978 settlement did not end disputes over this contract. Two
years later, government inspectors discovered major construction
flaws in the Los Angeles class SSN-688s built by Electric Boat. The
Navy required Electric Boat to perform extensive reinspections of
the submarines and to correct the flaws. Electric Boat submitted a
$100 million insurance claim against the government to recover
these costs and eventually parlayed this claim into additional con-
tracts for nuclear submarines with profit potential of more than
$100 million. In the end, General Dynamics was compensated for
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1. Electric Boat was not the only shipyard to file monumental contract claims during
the mid-1970s. The Navy's two other principal shipbuilders, Newport News Shipbuild-
ing and Dry Dock Company and Ingalls Shipbuilding, had also filed claims for approxi-
mately $1.7 billion. Together, these claims threatened to bankrupt the Navy's budget
for ship procurement. Hidalgo, An After-look at History, Sea Power, Apr. 1982, at 42,
46.
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cost overruns, forgiven for delays in delivery, and rewarded with fol-
low-on contracts.
This Article uses the procurement of the SSN-668 submarines
from General Dynamics to explore the role of contract in the weap-
ons acquisition process and to evaluate United States naval ship
procurement policy. 2 The SSN-688 is a particularly useful case
through which to scrutinize the weapons acquisition process for
three reasons. First, nuclear submarines are among the largest indi-
vidual capital items in the defense budget.3 The duration and scope
of the acquisition process make them especially suited to test the
limits of contract. Second, General Dynamics is one of the nation's
largest defense contractors, with a long history of government con-
tracting. Third, the SSN-688 submarine procurement has suffered
spectacular cost overruns and schedule delays. Although this Arti-
cle focuses on problems in the initial procurement of the SSN-688
submarine beginning in the 1970s, the Navy's recent procurement
of SSN-688s has also been plagued by cost overruns.4 Focusing on
the breakdowns which led to these dismal results brings to light the
limits and weaknesses of the procurement process.
This Article will examine how, in the SSN-688 fiasco, fixed-price
contracts failed to order and regulate the relationship between de-
fense contractors and the government. It will also focus on political
and economic factors endemic to the defense procurement process,
particularly to the United States shipbuilding industry, that contrib-
uted to this breakdown.
The first section of this Article discusses in general terms the role
and limitations of contract in the weapons procurement process.
Within this framework, the case study presents three critical epi-
sodes in the procurement of the SSN-688 submarine. Each episode
illustrates a different aspect of the general theme that the procure-
ment process fails to manage the tension between the need for sta-
bility and the need for change. The first episode is Electric Boat's
filing of a contract claim for more than $500 million in 1976. The
second episode involves the role of contract in the resolution of the
claim-a 1978 settlement that covered a loss of nearly $850 million.
The final episode is Electric Boat's use of an insurance claim to ob-
2. Although the scope of this study is the entire weapons acquisition process, the
focus is the procurement phase, rather than research and development.
3. Only aircraft carriers have a higher unit cost than nuclear submarines.
4. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1988, at A8. The Navy will have to pay an estimated $650




tain follow-on contracts that would generate profits of more than
$100 million.
I. The Contract in Major Weapons System Acquisition
This section compares the background norms and conditions of a
major weapons system 5 contract with the traditional legal model of a
contract and the economic model of a competitive market. 6 The
most important comparative characteristics are the context of the
transaction, the nature of the market, the extent of certainty in key
terms, the nature of change, and the nature of dispute resolution.
A. The Context of the Transaction
In contrast to the classical contract model in which parties negoti-
ate discrete transactions at arm's length, parties to defense procure-
ment contracts negotiate individual contracts in the context of long-
term symbiotic relationships. Both government and industry tend
to characterize their relationships as requiring trust and confidence
between the parties. Defense contractors and their government
counterparts often spend large portions of their professional ca-
reers working jointly on major weapons programs; the personal
connections between a government official and a contractor are
often as strong as the institutional relationships. 7 Because the rela-
tionships between the parties to the agreement generally continue
across many transactions and are not confined to a particular con-
tract, the contractual structure in weapons procurement must be
able to support a continually evolving relationship between the con-
tractor and the government.
B. The Nature of the Market
The classical economic model of a competitive market has at least
three major characteristics. First, it has many buyers and sellers.
Second, price competition largely determines the level of product
5. Major weapons systems include large aircraft, missiles, ships, and submarines,
representing approximately 65% of Defense Department procurement and research and
development expenditures. The largest defense firms are usually the prime contractors
for such systems. The MAC Group, The Impact on Defense Industrial Capability of
Changes in Procurement and Tax Policy, 1984-1987, at 6 (1988).
6. For analyses of traditional or "ideal-type" contracts, see F. Scherer, The Weapons
Acquisition Process: Economic Incentives (1964); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of
Long-term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical, and Relational Contract
Law, 72 Nw. U.L. Rev. 854 (1978); Stinchcombe, Contracts as Hierarchical Documents,
in Organization Theory and Project Management 121-71 (1985).
7. See J. Fox, Arming America: How the U.S. Buys Weapons 169-223 (1974).
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sales. While product differentiation may affect price, the variance
between products is relatively low, as in, for example, such products
as toothpaste. Third, competitive markets have relatively low barri-
ers preventing new firms from entering the market.
The market for major weapons systems acquisition departs from
the competitive market model in several significant ways. On the
supply side, although many firms produce weapons systems, there is
such high product differentiation that there are generally only a
handful of suppliers for any given system.8 Furthermore, the barri-
ers to entry are extremely high, the greatest barrier being the need
for specialized equipment and for enormous engineering and scien-
tific capability. Although government regulation and reporting re-
quirements9 partially substitute for price competition, they impose
additional barriers to entry. On the demand side, the government is
the sole buyer. Factors such as the political climate, events abroad,
and executive and legislative initiatives-not variance in price-de-
termine the demand for major weapons systems, thus making de-
mand highly inelastic.
C. The Uncertainty of Specifications, Performance, and Cost
In traditional contracts, the parties fix design specifications, per-
formance requirements, and cost in the initial bargain.' 0 In a weap-
ons acquisition contract, however, the parties determine
specifications of the system during the course of the contract and
change them numerous times during both development and
production. 1
8. The defense industry is divided into many sectors, each of which relies on differ-
ent manufacturing processes and basic technologies. Some of the primary sectors of the
defense industry include ships, aircraft, tracked vehicles, munitions, electronics, satel-
lites, and missiles. See generally J. Gansler, The Defense Industry 162-203 (1980).
9. Federal Acquisition Regulations System (FAR), 48 C.F.R. §§ 1-51 (1987).
10. For example, when an auto manufacturer contracts to purchase steel ball bear-
ings from a supplier, the contract includes precise specifications as to the dimensions,
weight, volume, and quality of the item. The contract also contains a definite cost term,
even if it provides that the price may be affected by such externalities as inflation or
changes in the cost of transportation. Furthermore, the performance required by each
party is clearly stated in the contract and is relatively easy to measure. The supplier is
required to deliver a certain quantity of steel ball bearings to a specific location on a
specific date(s). The performance of each party is independent: the supplier makes and
delivers the ball bearings (depending on the terms of the contract); the auto manufac-
turer pays for the product.
11. "Both the normal economic models of a market transaction and the legal model
of a contract tend to obscure the degree to which large numbers of contracts are (realis-
tically though not legally) agreements to deliver an indefinite good or service for an
indefinite price." Stinchcombe, supra note 6, at 146.
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Performance in a procurement contract is difficult to measure
because the activities of both parties to the contract are highly inter-
dependent. For example, the government has an ongoing responsi-
bility to furnish a considerable amount of equipment and data
necessary to the performance of the contract.' 2 If the provision of
this equipment and data is delayed or deficient, contract costs will
increase. Separating the extent of the overrun that is attributable to
the government's own failure from that attributable to the contrac-
tor can be difficult, if not impossible.
Even though many weapons system procurement contracts are
based on a so-called "fixed price," the cost of procurement is diffi-
cult to project. New weapons systems generally attempt to push
technological frontiers that have no market equivalent as a price ref-
erence. Moreover, inflation, changes in the labor rate, and market
prices for the many materials used to build a complex system can
only be estimated. In addition, given the structural incentives to se-
cure funding from Congress, there is an overwhelming pressure to
underestimate various costs, even if the resulting level of funding is
inadequate.' 3 Finally, future changes in the program's require-
ments, such as quantity, schedule, and specifications, add to cost
uncertainty.
D. The Administrative Nature of Change
Changes in specifications and performance are standard in a
weapons acquisition contract. Changes may be necessary in order
to eliminate a recently discovered safety hazard, to introduce new
technological improvements, or to satisfy performance demands of
particular military officers. Traditional contracts respond to the
conflict between the need for stability and the necessity of change
without shifting the risks of resulting losses away from the seller.' 4
Weapons acquisition contracts, however, create elaborate adminis-
trative mechanisms to allocate the costs of changes between the gov-
ernment and the seller. 15
12. See General Accounting Office, Navy Contracting: Cost Overruns and Claims
Potential on Navy Shipbuilding Contracts, Report to the Chairman, Subcomm. on De-
fense, House Comm. on Appropriations, GAO/NSIAD-88-15, at 8 (1987).
13. For example, the Defense Department's forecast of the inflation rate for 1974
was 5.8%, while the Consumer Price Index was 12.2%. Inaccuracy of Department of
Defense Weapons Acquisition Cost Estimates, H.R. Rep. No. 656, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
17 (1979). This report also stated that the initial Planning Estimate of major systems was
on average 100% below actual cost [sic], while the later, more refined Development
Estimate was on average 50% below actual procurement costs. Id. at 3.
14. Macneil, supra note 6, at 861.
15. See infra notes 57-62 and accompanying text.
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The two categories of changes made are "directed" and "con-
structive" changes. In a directed change, the government con-
tracting officer orders a contract change directly. He may, for
example, order a change to correct a deficiency, to meet a new re-
quirement, or to cut costs.16 The government compensates contrac-
tors for directed changes through an "equitable adjustment" in the
contract price or delivery schedule.'
7
A constructive change results from some government action or
inaction that indirectly affects the contractor's costs. For example,
an order to change certain welds on a submarine may cause the con-
tractor to incur additional costs besides those to correct the welds,
such as delays in other construction work. Liability for constructive
changes is far more controversial than for directed changes, since
responsibility for the change, and, therefore, the assignment of ad-
ded cost, is more difficult to determine. If the government agrees to
accept responsibility for a constructive change, it compensates the
contractor with an equitable adjustment as if the change were di-
rected.' 8 If the government denies the contractor's submission of a
constructive change, the contractor may reassert his claim through
the administrative mechanism of a contract claim.' °
E. Dispute Resolution
While traditional contractual disputes are litigated, and often ter-
minate the contractual relationship, 20 disputes in the weapons ac-
quisition process are resolved largely through negotiation.
In the first phase of a dispute in a weapons acquisition contract,
one of the contracting parties petitions for an adjustment as a right
given by the contract,2 1 and the government contracting officer de-
16. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1(a) (1987).
17. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 42.204(b) (1985).
18. "In a very rough way, a 'constructive' change amounts to treating a transaction
under a Government contract as if it were an order under the 'Changes' clause and thus
making available the contractual remedy of 'equitable adjustment.' " J. Whelan, Federal
Government Contracts 401-402 (1985).
19. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 52.243-1 (e). See also Ass't Secretary of the Navy, Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics, Dep't of the Navy, Naval Ship Procurement Process Study
231 (July 1978) [hereinafter Naval Ship Procurement Process Study].
20. In discrete transactions, "no significant relations exist to be preserved when con-
flicts arise .... The existence of the market that the discrete transactional system pre-
supposes eliminates the necessity for economic relations between the firms to continue
in spite of the disputes. That market, rather than continued relations between these
particular parties, will supply their future needs." Macneil, supra note 6, at 861.
21. According to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), a "claim" by one of the
contracting parties is the demand, "as a matter of right," for "the payment of money in a
sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising




termines the claim's validity. The decision can be appealed. 22 Even
if formal, established mechanisms do not bring about resolution of
the dispute, contractual performance continues until the dispute is
resolved through negotiation and settlement. 23
II. The $500 Million Breakdown
This section examines the structural and procedural problems of
the procurement process that led to Electric Boat's $500 million
contract claim. 24 The first part of this section describes the struc-
ture of the shipbuilding industry. The second part looks at salient
examples of contracting practices that contributed to procurement
problems. Overall, this section reveals how contracting policies and
practices created incentives for the contractor and the government
to act in ways contrary to the most efficient outcome for the
program.
A. The Structure of the Shipbuilding Industry
The shipbuilding industry, like the other major sectors of the de-
fense industry-aircraft and missile production-does not possess
the features of a competitive market. On the demand side, the De-
fense Department is the only buyer.25 Moreover, demand is not
constant; it is sporadic and unpredictable, depending on yearly ap-
propriations by Congress. On the supply side, stable growth is diffi-
cult for individual firms to achieve, given the uncertainty of product
demand. Severe barriers to market entry limit the number of
22. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 52.233-1(0 (1987).
23. "The Contractor shall proceed diligently with the performance of this contract,
pending final resolution of any request for relief, claim, appeal, or action arising under
the contract, and comply with any decision of the Contracting Officer." FAR, 48 C.F.R.
§ 52.233-1(h) (1987).
24. Shortly after General Dynamics and the Navy settled their claims dispute in June
1978, theJustice Department launched a two-year grand jury probe to investigate allega-
tions that General Dynamics' employees had defrauded the Navy by intentionally sub-
mitting false, misleading, or padded contract claims. Federal prosecutors announced in
January 1982, that they would not seek indictments against General Dynamics or any of
its employees for the 1976 contract claims. J. Goodwin, Brotherhood of Arms: General
Dynamics and the Business of Defending America 270 (1985). In early 1987, the latest
investigations of General Dynamics on the SSN-688 program ended, again with no
charges brought. Wall Street Journal, May 2, 1987, at 21. Some continue to believe,
however, that General Dynamics officials, in particular Chairman David Lewis, de-
frauded the government by intentionally submitting unrealistically low bids for eleven of
the eighteen submarines. Id. By focusing attention on the possible illegalities in the
case, however, critics have ignored the larger structural problems with the contract
process.
25. Although some items, for example the F-16 aircraft, are sold to other govern-
ments, it is the United States government that determines whether such sales will occur.
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firms, 26 and because only a few full-scale shipbuilding firms exist,
only small, relatively simple programs are suitable for open
competition.
2 7
In 1969, Electric Boat had no new ship construction contracts, but
by 1974 the yard had won contracts to build 18 new attack subma-
rines and the first Trident submarine, adding almost $2.4 billion to
the shipyard's coffers. 28 This deluge of business was not the result
of Electric Boat's increased competitiveness or productivity; it was
due to increased concentration in the American shipbuilding indus-
try as a result of the government's decision to withdraw from active
production. 29 By the time Electric Boat filed its contract claim in
1977, only nine yards were engaged in Navy shipbuilding and only
three of the nine were certified to build nuclear-powered ships:
Electric Boat, Newport News, and Ingalls. 30 The three shipyards ac-
counted for more than three-quarters (77%) of the dollar value of
new Navy ship orders between 1973 and 1977.31 This concentra-
tion in the attack submarine program meant less competition among
suppliers and less pressure to keep prices down.
The nature of the shipbuilding industry's labor market also con-
tributed to the large cost increases in Electric Boat's attack subma-
rine program.3 2 The productivity of shipyard workers is lower than
26. Marketing is conducted primarily through direct selling, which requires special-
ized knowledge; highly specialized engineering and scientific capability is required; and
capital requirements are high.
27. For example, about 92% of naval ship construction appropriations for fiscal year
1979 were placed with sources that were determined without competition. Naval Ship
Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 79-80.
28. Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 50-51.
29. Through the 1950s the Navy had relied on both government-owned shipbuild-
ing facilities and on privately-owned shipyards such as Electric Boat. When studies con-
ducted during the 1960s showed that private yards could produce ships at lower cost
because of their lower labor and material costs and higher worker productivity, Presi-
dentJohnson decided that private yards should produce all future naval ships. Goodwin,
supra note 24, at 100-01.
30. At the time, Ingalls performed nuclear repair work only. Naval Ship Procure-
ment Process Study, supra note 19, at 18. Both General Dynamic's Quincy shipyard and
the Ingalls shipyard have built nuclear ships in the past and could be recertified to in-
crease competition or to stabilize the workforce in these yards. Gansler, supra note 8, at
185-87.
31. Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 18. In contrast, the
percentage of sales by the top four firms in the entire shipbuilding industry was 40%.
Gansler, supra note 8, at 185.
32. Shipbuilding is more labor-intensive than other sectors of the defense industry;
thus, labor problems have a proportionately greater impact on overall costs. Naval Ship
Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 24. Complicating these problems is the
nature of ship construction itself. Unlike other sectors of the defense industry, ship
construction does not resemble a production line. Each ship or submarine is individu-
ally constructed. Building a submarine is more like constructing a large building than it




that of workers in comparable industries and has been steadily de-
clining since the late 1950s. 33 Nevertheless, Electric Boat's fixed-
price contracts to construct 18 new attack submarines did not as-
sume that labor productivity would continue to decline over the life
of the program; indeed, the contracts assumed the opposite-that
productivity levels would return to the higher rates of the 1960s.
3 4
A major problem in the shipbuilding workforce is the extremely
high turnover rates at the yards, totaling approximately 75% of the
workforce in 1977.35 At Electric Boat, the workforce more than
doubled from the date the first attack submarine contract was
awarded in January 1971 to the time the contract claim was filed in
1977. This influx of new workers amplified the inefficiencies in pro-
duction.3 6 Furthermore, absenteeism among the workers was about
307,.37
Recruiting the required labor force at Electric Boat was difficult
because of a prevailing low wage rate. Through the mid-1960s, the
shipbuilding industry's salaries were competitive with those of com-
parable industries. But when private yards became the sole produ-
cers of naval ships in 1967, their salaries did not keep pace with
comparable competitive industries. By the mid-1970s, the ship-
building industry paid considerably lower hourly rates than other
competitive labor markets; for example, shipbuilding paid approxi-
mately 20% less than the heavy construction industry. 38 Low sala-
ries decreased the supply of available workers. As the yard
This labor intensity means that the value-added per worker in the shipbuilding industry
is less than in comparable industries. Approximately 80% of the workers in a private
shipyard are production workers, as compared with the aircraft industry where about
48% of the employees are production workers and many of the others are engineers.
Gansler, supra note 8, at 192.
33. Id. at 192-93.
34. General Dynamics was able to reduce its bid for the second flight of eleven attack
submarines in part by setting high productivity targets based on 1960s data, despite the
continuing downward trend. P. Tyler, Running Critical: The Silent War, Rickover, and
General Dynamics 128 (1986).
35. The turnover rate in private shipyards is about 13% per month, which is over
four times that in the aircraft industry and more than six times that in the Navy's own
shipyards. Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 27. The studies
show that a new worker in a yard is only 50% efficient in his first two years of work.
Gansler, supra note 8, at 191.
36. Electric Boat's labor force grew by 250% from approximately 12,000 workers in
January 1971, when the first attack submarine contract was awarded, to almost 30,000 in
mid-1976. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 124; see also Naval Ship Procurement Process
Study, supra note 19, at 76.
37. Tyler, supra note 34, at 148.
38. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Earn-
ings, United States, 1909-1975, Bulletin 1312-10, cited in Naval Ship Procurement Pro-
cess Study, supra note 19, at 26. The average weekly paycheck for a shipyard production
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increased its labor force to meet the contract demands, it had to
choose between quantity-large numbers of less skilled workers-
and quality-fewer, more highly skilled workers. It chose quantity.
Exhausting local labor pools, Electric Boat became so desperate
for workers that at one time it chartered as many as 50 buses a day
to transport workers to its Connecticut shipyard from as far away as
Boston and New York. As the yard hired more workers, the skill
standards dropped.
3 9
In sum, the structural conditions of the shipbuilding labor force-
declining productivity, high turnover, low wages, and a shortage of
skilled workers-were a major source of the inefficiency that con-
tributed to cost growth in the SSN-688 program. "The Defense De-
partment, the Navy, and congressional investigators are in rare
agreement about what went wrong at the Groton shipyard," For-
tune magazine reported. "As the work force was doubled to a peak
of 30,000 in mid-1977, the yard suffered the corporate equivalent of
a nervous breakdown."
40
B. Contracting Practices and Management
In the acquisition of major weapons systems, contracting practices
and management methods are a partial substitute for price competi-
tion. In the absence of free market competition, these practices and
methods bear a greater burden of ensuring that the Defense Depart-
ment buys the best possible product at a reasonable price and that it
acquires it in a timely fashion. Many of the contracting practices
used in the SSN-688 attack submarine acquisition permitted condi-
tions to develop which rendered keeping costs within the contract's
ceiling extremely difficult and caused unnecessary inefficiencies and
schedule delays. Contracting practices were critical at three differ-
ent stages: (1) the initial submarine design process, (2) the selection
of the type of contract for development and procurement, and
(3) the process for managing production changes. Most of the prac-
worker in 1976 was about $247; the paycheck for a building construction worker was
about $285 per week. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 124.
In addition, income in the shipbuilding industry does not rise much with the age of
the worker, as it does in comparable industries such as construction. This adds to the
turnover rate, as there is an incentive to leave shipbuilding for other more lucrative
positions. Gansler, supra note 8, at 192.
39. The percentage of skilled workers at the shipyard plummeted from 80% in 1972
to 35% four years later. As the work force grew, each experienced employee had to
train more workers. "What happened was we lost a good welder and got a bad supervi-
sor," recalled one Electric Boat manager. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 126.





tices discussed below are illustrative of government contract prac-
tices for major weapons system acquisition.
1. The submarine design process. Uncertainty in contractual
specifications is inherent in the process of designing a submarine.
The total design cycle for a submarine is eight years, including vari-
ous coordinated design phases. One source of design problems on
the SSN-688 program was poor integration of various phases of the
design cycle. Independent design companies conducted prelimi-
nary and contract design work with guidance from Navy personnel
at Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA). 4 t They gave the de-
signs to a private shipyard for detailed design work and construc-
tion. This separation of preliminary from detailed design work
fostered manufacturing inefficiency in two ways. First, it en-
couraged designing for performance without sufficient considera-
tion of production methods and costs. 42 Second, since every
shipyard uses different manufacturing equipment and different pro-
duction methods, designs that were not tailored to the capabilities
of the particular shipyard resulted in inefficient production methods
and increased the need for design changes during the production
process.43 An additional design problem that plagued the SSN-688
program was "concurrency"-beginning series production before
completing and testing the first unit.4 4 In essence, the 688 design
had not been "debugged" before Electric Boat began to construct
its first fleet of seven submarines. The many design changes that
41. The Navy had a policy of selecting only one shipyard to do the detailed design
work for a class of submarines. In this case, Admiral Hyman Rickover, the legendary
father of the nuclear navy and czar of navy nuclear contracts, awarded the design con-
tract for the SSN-688 to Newport News, although it had never designed a nuclear sub-
marine. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 108. Electric Boat was the only private shipyard that
previously had designed nuclear-powered submarines, designing every one since the
Nautilus, the world's first nuclear-powered submarine.
One account suggests that Rickover worried that Electric Boat felt few competitive
pressures to hold down design costs when it possessed a monopoly on submarine de-
sign; thus, awarding the contract to another yard would introduce a new competitiveness
into the SSN-688 submarine program. Id. Another account suggests that Rickover, who
was known for his visceral dislike of all defense contractors, was angry at Electric Boat
for having taken a concept design contract on a rival submarine design that Rickover
opposed. In this political struggle, General Dynamics was allied with Secretary of De-
fense McNamara against Rickover and the Congress. When Rickover won the battle, he
punished General Dynamics by awarding the design contract, which traditionally in-
cludes the contract to build the lead ship as well, to Newport News. Tyler, supra note 34,
at 94-95.
42. Gansler, supra note 8, at 194.
43. Naval Ship Procurement Process Study (NSPPS), supra note 19, at 64. One of the
conclusions of the NSPPS was that NAVSEA should increase its efforts to involve
shipbuilders early in the contract design process so that the designs reflect the construc-
tion methodology of each shipbuilder. Id. at 261.
44. Hidalgo, supra note I, at 46.
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had to be made during the production process increased costs and
caused delays.
2. Selecting a contract type: fixed-price vs. cost-plus. The two ge-
neric types of contracts used in weapons acquisition are fixed-price
incentive contracts and cost reimbursement or cost-plus contracts.
The Navy's choice of a fixed-price incentive contract to govern pro-
curement of the SSN-688 submarines established the framework in
which the contract claims arose. Under a cost-plus contract, the
contractor is reimbursed for all allowable costs without limitation,
so that the government absorbs all the risks of contract perform-
ance. In contrast, under a fixed-price incentive contract the contrac-
tor is reimbursed for allowable costs only to a limit called the
"ceiling price," so that the contractor and the government agree to
share the risks of contract performance.
45
Each type of contract presents certain dangers or disadvantages
for the government. Under a fixed-price contract, the government
fears that the contractor may try to "buy-in"-to submit an unrealis-
tically low bid to win the contract with the hope of recouping costs
through follow-on contracts with higher prices, through production
change orders, or through contract claims that the government feels
compelled to pay because liability cannot be conclusively deter-
mined.46 The Packard Commission observed that: "Fixed-price
contracts effectively can enshrine overstated requirements and un-
45. In a fixed-price incentive contract, several figures are negotiated at the outset.
The "target cost" represents the estimate of costs the contractor will incur. The "target
price" is the target cost plus negotiated profit. The "ceiling price" is the Navy's maxi-
mum liability under the contract. The ceiling price is expressed as a percentage of tar-
get cost-such as 120% or 130%. The percentage is known as the "ceiling price
spread." The larger the spread, the greater the Navy's liability for costs and the less risk
to the contractor.
The Defense Procurement Handbook of 1968 described the virtues of fixed price
contracts:
At a specified price, the contractor assumes all financial risks of performance. His
profit depends entirely on his ability to control his costs. The Government bears no
risk of loss under the contract. A firm fixed-price contract thus gives the contractor
the maximum incentive (i) to avoid waste and (ii) to use production and subcon-
tracting methods that will save labor and materials.
The firm fixed-price contract has another great advantage for the Government: it
is relatively easy and inexpensive to administer. It also benefits the contractor. The
Government does not monitor his costs, so he does not have to conform his ac-
counting methods to DOD audit procedures. His administrative costs are therefore
lowered too.
Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Procurement Handbook, at v-7, as quoted in
Fox, supra note 7, at 227.
46. The NSPPS concluded that the Navy needed to adopt new techniques to try to
prevent contract awards at unrealistic prices, for example, by making one of the propo-
sal evaluation factors the validity of the cost estimates. Naval Ship Procurement Process




derstated costs in a legal arrangement that allows little or no flexi-
bility for needed trade-offs between cost and performance. This
contractual arrangement, intended to protect the government, may
cause both sides to lose."
47
Under a cost-plus contract, on the other hand, the contractor has
no incentive to improve productivity because such improvement
would cut costs and reduce overall profit. Indeed, the contractor
has an incentive to spend as much money as possible because most
of it will be reimbursed by the government. Cost-reimbursement
contracts place a heavy administrative burden on both the govern-
ment and the contractor to establish a reliable accounting system.
In the 1970s the Navy strongly preferred fixed-price contracts;
cost-plus contracts were used when the magnitude of the uncertain-
ties in the work to be performed precluded the use of an acceptable
fixed-price arrangement. 48 A fixed-price contract is superior to a
cost-plus contract when reasonably definite design or performance
specifications are available and when the contracting parties agree at
the outset on prices that are judged to be fair and reasonable. 49 De-
spite the uncertainties in costs and design specifications in a subma-
rine program for which the lead ship had not even been built, the
Navy departed from past procurement practices and awarded Elec-
tric Boat a fixed-price contract. Both institutional and political fac-
tors contributed to this decision.
Institutionally, the Navy was reacting to a failed procurement
practice prominent in the 1960s, called Total Package Procurement.
This concept, generally based on a fixed-price incentive contract,
attempted to prevent shipbuilder "buy-ins" by asking contractors to
bid one overall price for the total procurement package--design,
development, production, and logistical support of a new weapons
system-rather than to submit separate bids for each successive
phase of the program. The purpose of the total package contract
was to extract the lowest possible price from contractors for the
complete weapons project and to shift the risk and program man-
agement responsibility to contractors. 50 However, tremendous cost
47. President's Blue Ribbon Comm'n on Defense Management (The Packard Com-
mission), A Formula for Action: A Report to the President on Defense Acquisition 46
(June 1986).
48. See Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 117-22.
49. The current FAR regulation states that the contract type should be determined
by "the degree of risk in contract performance. When the risk is minimal or can be
predicted with an acceptable degree of certainty, a firm fixed-price contract is preferred.
However, as the uncertainties become more significant, other fixed-price or cost-plus
contracts should be employed to accommodate these uncertainties and to avoid placing
too great a cost risk on the contractor." FAR, 48 C.FR. § 216.101 (1987).
50. Fox, supra note 7, at 244.
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overruns developed on programs procured under this procedure.
In one example, the total package concept was blamed for a 1977
claim by Ingalls shipyard for $1 billion involving construction of
nine amphibious assault ships and thirty Spruance class destroy-
ers. 5' This problem led the Navy to return to its traditional practice
of awarding separate contracts for the design and construction of
new ships.
Politically, the Navy, and Admiral Rickover in particular, realized
that fixed-price contracts were more likely to be approved by Con-
gress. At the time Congress began to consider the SSN-668 pro-
gram, fixed-price contracts looked like a better deal because they
fostered the illusion that all program costs could be adequately pre-
dicted. Once a program has gained a foothold in congressional ap-
propriations, Congress finds it difficult to ignore these sunk costs.
52
Rickover succeeded in securing funding from Congress by en-
couraging both inadequate cost estimates and narrow spread mar-
gins. Claiming that the new SSN-688 submarine was really only an
advanced version of the earlier SSN-637 Sturgeon class submarine,
Rickover argued that the contractors should base their cost esti-
mates on the costs of building the SSN-637. Although many Navy
procurement officials felt that the SSN-688 was really a new de-
sign,53 Rickover encouraged General Dynamics to rely on the SSN-
637 cost figures, which proved to be wholly inadequate and contrib-
uted greatly to the cost overruns. 54 Moreover, the ceiling price
spreads were clearly unrealistic. The ceiling price spread on Elec-
tric Boat's first SSN-688 contract to build seven submarines was
116%; the spread on a later SSN-688 contract was negotiated at
135%. 55  Yet, logic suggests that the ceiling price spreads should
decrease in successive contracts. A realistic cost-to-ceiling spread in
a fixed-price incentive contract is based on initial uncertainties in
the program, such as the complexity of the ship, the shipbuilder's
experience with similar vessels, and the availability of detailed
drawings for ship construction. 56 The uncertainties are greatest at
51. See Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 45. Litton, owner of the Ingalls shipyard at Pasca-
goula, Mississippi, filed contract claims on its two procurement programs about the
same time as General Dynamics filed its claims on the SSN-688 program. Id.
52. Tyler, supra note 34, at 134. Rickover had urged General Dynamics chairman
David Lewis to submit a fixed-price bid for the first Trident submarine in 1973, despite
the cost uncertainties, reassuring Lewis that the company could "restructure" the con-
tract to cover all costs of construction.
53. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 116.
54. Tyler, supra note 34, at 131.
55. General Accounting Office, Better Navy Management of Shipbuilding Contracts





the outset of the program, and should decrease as the contractor
and the Navy gain experience. The SSN-688 contract, however, did
not provide the necessary flexibility to accommodate the uncertain-
ties in the new program, and the wider spreads on the later con-
tracts reflected the large cost overruns and resulting claims on the
early contract.
3. Managing contract changes. The principal basis for Electric
Boat's $544 million claim was the staggering number of design
changes during the first five years of the contract. These changes
increased the cost of each submarine by $23 million.5 7 Both the mili-
tary service and the contractor have abused change orders in the
past.58 The military may use changes to "goldplate" a system by
adding capabilities that are unnecessary given the threat the system
is designed to meet and the cost constraints under which it is being
built. The contractor may abuse constructive changes by submit-
ting spurious requests for reimbursement of costs that it brought on
itself.5
9
Some design changes, on the other hand, are inevitable. Institu-
tional pressures to approve design changes are always present be-
cause Soviet capabilities continually improve over the life of a
procurement project and because each service wants its new system
to have the maximum performance capability. Furthermore, the
ships are built on a long construction cycle and, inevitably, those
involved in the planning, design, and drawing processes will disa-
gree on exactly how a complex naval vessel should perform. 60 The
extent to which such contract changes should be permitted is a ma-
jor issue in managing the cost growth of a major weapons system
acquisition.
The conflicting demands for flexibility and stability take their toll
on the procurement process. According to one report, the typical
effect of contract changes has been to increase contract costs by ap-
proximately 40%.6 1 Once a change has been made, the contractor
gains a dominant bargaining position, because the parties typically
negotiate payment for contract changes about four to seven months
after the contractor has submitted a change proposal-by which
time the work required by the change has already begun and may
even be complete. The parties often negotiate the payment for con-
57. Id. at 3.
58. See Fox, supra note 7, at 379-82.
59. Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 256.
60. Id. at 248.
61. RAND Report WN71 17, A Preliminary Analysis of Contractual Outcomes for 94
Air Force Systems Command Contracts 28 (Dec. 1970), cited in Fox, supra note 7, at 379.
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tract changes on the basis of actual costs incurred by the contractor,
as opposed to reasonable costs estimated by the government. Gov-
ernment contract officers have difficulty proving that costs already
incurred for changes should have been lower,62 and the contractor
has little incentive to control the costs of changes for which work is
partially or fully completed prior to negotiations.
General Dynamics claimed that 35,000 revisions made to approxi-
mately 5,000 detailed drawings provided to Electric Boat by the sub-
marine's designers, Newport News, were the cause of enormous cost
increases and schedule delays. 63 The Navy did not agree, noting
that Electric Boat had itself issued an average of five revisions to
every drawing used in the construction of the earlier SSN-637 class
submarine. Although the revisions were not wildly out of proportion
to the expected number of changes on a given contract, they may
nevertheless have contributed to cost growth. In the aftermath of
the claims controversy, the Navy sought to alter its policy on
changes to shift more of the risk to the contractor.64 The enormous
number of contract changes reflects the tension between the needs
of stability and flexibility in the procurement process.
III. The $850 Million Fix
In June 1978, the Navy and General Dynamics signed an $843
million agreement in order to settle the $544 million contract claim
originally filed in 1976.65 The final cost figure had increased by
nearly $300 million to account for the additional cost growth and
inflation that occurred after the claim was filed. In two years, the
cost of procuring 18 attack submarines had increased by more than
50%.
Because both parties agreed that liability for the increased costs
could not be conclusively determined, each side consented to accept
62. Fox, supra note 7, at 377. The U.S. Court of Claims has held that there is no
better proof of the cost of a change than the actual cost. Bruce Constr. Co. v. United
States, 324 F.2d 516 (1963).
63. "Maybe there were only five thousand changes that really ripped something out
and replaced it with something else," conceded General Dynamics Chairman Lewis.
"But the cumulative effect of all that in purchasing, procurement, manufacturing, plan-
ning and so on was enormous." Goodwin, supra note 24, at 120.
64. The Naval Ship Procurement Process Study recommended adding a provision to
deny "shipbuilders any recovery for costs incurred where failure of notice after the ship-
builder knew or should have known of the problem deprived the Navy of the opportu-
nity to solve the problem and to save the costs." Naval Ship Procurement Process
Study, supra note 19, at 262-63.
65. General Accounting Office, Navy Contracting: Status of the 1978 Shipbuilding
Claim Settlement at Electric Boat, Report to the Congress, GAO/NSIAD-86-54, at 1




part of the blame and shoulder part of the burden. While a Navy
Claims Settlement Board had determined that Electric Boat was
"entitled" to only $125 million of its original $544 million claim, in
the final settlement Electric Boat received $484 million-$359 mil-
lion in addition to the $125 million "entitlement.- 66 The settlement
provided that General Dynamics would accept as a loss the other
half of the $718 million difference between its "entitlement" and
final $843 million claim.
67
The settlement between the Navy and General Dynamics did not
reflect the merits of the claim as much as it did the limits of the
contractual structure in setting the terms of the procurement rela-
tionship. When the government signs a contract to procure a major
weapons system, it agrees to pay for the procedures and processes
under which the activity will be conducted, as much as it agrees to
purchase the actual weapons system. The claims controversy in this
case reflected a breakdown in the government-contractor relation-
ship, not in the final manufactured product.
A. The Stop-Work Strategy
Several days before the June 1978 settlement, Electric Boat issued
dismissal notices to 8,000 of its 14,000 workers at the Groton ship-
yard. Electric Boat threatened to stop work on the SSN-688 pro-
gram until a settlement was reached to shift the burden of paying
for the continued cost of construction to the government. Electric
Boat hoped that the stop-work threat would force the Navy to go to
federal court seeking a temporary injunction compelling the ship-
yard to continue working.68 Electric Boat believed that even if the
court determined that the shipyard must continue working "in the
interest of national defense," 69 the Navy would most likely be or-
dered to pay the actual costs incurred during continued construction
66. For an explanation of entitlement calculations, see infra note 86.
67. GAO Report on Status of Claim Settlement, supra note 65, at 1. Electric Boat's
final estimated loss at completion was approximately $125 million more than the $359
million the contractor agreed to absorb as part of the 1978 settlement. In the settle-
ment, the Navy agreed to share equally with Electric Boat such additional cost overruns
up to $100 million. Id
68. Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 45.
69. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 137.
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as progress payments 70 while the larger claims question was being
resolved.
7 1
The award of progress payments would shift the financial burden
of delay to the government and provide an immediate injection of
cash into the shipyard.72 Recovering money already spent by the
contractors would be difficult in later negotiations. Electric Boat
would have no incentive to control costs on contract work con-
ducted during the negotiation period, since such work would be
performed on a "cost-plus" basis.
Outside of the courts, the government had little recourse against
a stop-work order. Even though the Secretary of the Navy
threatened to pull the unfinished submarines out of Electric Boat
and place them into other yards, the only other shipyard qualified to
build the submarines, Newport News, was also locked in a contract
dispute with the Navy.73 The Carter Administration did not want to
substantially delay the delivery of submarines considered essential
to countering Soviet naval capabilities. In addition, the shipyard
was building the first Trident submarine as well as the SSN-688 at-
tack submarine. The Trident, a ballistic missile carrying submarine,
was a key component of the Carter Administration's strategic arms
policy. A shutdown on the SSN-688 program would essentially halt
Trident construction as well, because union rules allowed senior
workers on the SSN-688 program to "bump" less senior workers on
the Trident program, creating labor chaos at the shipyard that
70. Progress payments are regular payments made by a military service to its con-
tractors to reimburse them for their allowable costs of doing business. The theory be-
hind progress payments is that the contractor should not have to finance a large portion
of the allowable costs of performing under a contract that may extend five or more
years. Contractors generally prefer to have up to 95% or 98% of their costs covered by
progress payments, in order to minimize their own financing costs. To retain some fi-
nancial leverage over the company until the work is satisfactorily completed, however,
the military traditionally prefers to withhold part of the contractor's progress payments.
71. Such a strategy had worked effectively for Litton several years earlier. In June
1976, acting on advice from the same lawyer retained by Electric Boat, Litton had
threatened to stop work on five amphibious assault vehicles at its Ingalls shipyard. A
federal district court in Mississippi had issued a temporary injunction requiring the ship-
yard to keep working but making the Navy bear the financial burden. See Hidalgo, supra
note 1, at 45. The Navy was ordered to provide Litton with progress payments that
would cover 91% of the shipyard's costs for work it had already performed and for work
it would perform while its claim was being negotiated. Id. at 46.
72. In October 1986, Congress passed legislation lowering the progress payment
rates by five percentage points to 75% for large businesses and 85% for small busi-
nesses. Exceptions to this restriction can still be made for shipbuilding, military con-
struction, and other contractors who have demonstrated financial need. Continuing
Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-591, § 9105, 1986 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News (100 Stat.) 3341, 3341-18.




would take months to resolve. Thus, Electric Boat was effectively
threatening to delay the Trident program until a settlement was
reached on the SSN-688s.7
4
B. Options for Resolution
The Navy and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
presented three options to President Carter for resolving the crisis.
One option was to follow the traditional legal route of litigation,
which some thought would restore public faith in the contracting
process.7 5 But the Navy had already spent time and $50 million as-
sessing and challenging the claims.76 Had the President chosen to
litigate, the end result might have been a court order requiring the
Navy to pay Electric Boat actual costs while it continued working on
the submarines. 77 Protracted litigation could have delayed the
Navy's receipt of the submarines into operational inventory for sev-
eral years, imposing greater costs than any settlement. The view
from the Defense Department was that "protracted and wasteful liti-
gation would seriously endanger essential programs, uncertainties
and cash flow demands would jeopardize the financial position of
the contractors, and ship construction would be severely
destabilized. -
78
The government's second option was to take over the shipyards
and to operate them as government facilities under contract to one
of the shipbuilding companies. Admiral Rickover supported this
option; he wanted to enforce the contracts to the letter.79 The legal
validity of any government takeover was highly doubtful because the
Supreme Court had found such seizures of private enterprises with-
out congressional authorization unconstitutional in Youngstown Sheet
and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.80 In addition, no other contractor could take
over the entire SSN-688 submarine program: Newport News al-
74. Tyler's account called this move "a form of blackmail against the new adminis-
tration, revealing a deep cynicism in the relationship between the businessmen who
were running a key defense industry and the Pentagon." Tyler, supra note 34, at 192.
75. Id. at 151.
76. Id. at 226. Secretary of the Navy William Claytor stated: "I am an old trial law-
yer, and litigation does not frighten me, but I know what its disadvantages are, and it
sure includes taking the time of the productive people in testimony, in hours and hours
and days and days of depositions, in answering extensive and difficult interrogatories,
and in doing almost everything except getting on with the job of building ships." Good-
win, supra note 24, at 141.
77. The Navy had, in fact, prepared pleadings to be filed if this option were chosen.
78. Richardson, The Use of the General and Residual Powers under Pub. L. No. 85-
804 in the Department of Defense, 14 Pub. Cont. LJ. 128, 147 (1983).
79. Tyler, supra note 34, at 226.
80. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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ready had its share of submarine contracts, and it, too, was at war
with the Navy. 8' Navy officials did not seriously consider this option.
The third option for the government, a negotiated settlement be-
tween the Navy and Electric Boat outside the terms of the contract,
had the support of Navy claims negotiator Edward Hidalgo, Secre-
tary of the Navy Claytor, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, and
Brown's deputy, Charles Duncan. 2 However, this strategy was not
widely accepted within the uniformed Navy, and it became the
source of a bitter dispute between political appointees, like Claytor
and Hidalgo, and the "permanent Navy. ' 8 3 The Carter appointees
attributed a large part of the claims problem to the fact that Rick-
over had simply asked Electric Boat to build too many submarines in
too little time after awarding the design and prototype contract to
Newport News. Senior political officials saw the contract claims as a
thorn in the side of the President's ambitious program to revitalize
the nation's defenses and to achieve an arms-control agreement
with the Soviets. Halting construction on the Los Angeles and Tri-
dent submarines would mean a loss of negotiating power with the
Soviets. Further, the claims controversy diverted public attention
from other national security issues and reflected poorly on the new
administration.
Officers in the Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) had a dif-
ferent view of how the claims should be handled. According to one
account, NAVSEA saw the claims as part of an "ongoing procure-
ment battle rather than as a political embarrassment to be dealt with
expediently."14 They bitterly resented the willingness of their polit-
ical superiors to reach an agreement with the contractors, especially
an agreement that they felt was unjustified. NAVSEA agreed with
the conclusions of the Navy Claims Settlement Board8 5 that Electric
Boat was entitled8 6 to only $125 million of its $544 million claim, or
81. Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 52.
82. Tyler, supra note 34, at 226.
83. See Hidalgo, supra note 1, at 46.
84. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 135.
85. Established in 1976, the Navy Claims Settlement Board was staffed by 10 to 40
lawyers and engineers. Economics of Defense Procurement: Shipbuilding Claims:
Hearings before the Subcomm. on Priorities and Economy in Gov't of the Joint Eco-
nomic Comm., 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 138-39 (Dec. 29, 1977) (testimony of Admiral
Manganaro).
86. In determining a contractor's entitlement, the Board evaluated "omnibus" or
general claims submitted by the contractor, breaking them down into specific claims and
determining the probable validity of each. The Navy would pay the actual dollar value
of each specific instance of injury to the contractor that was caused by the Navy, plus
additional costs associated with the claim. The Board's determination included amounts




23 cents on the dollar. If the Board's figure had been the final
award, General Dynamics probably would have followed through
with its threat to stop work, alleging breach of contract by the Navy.
Therefore, the political authorities turned to extra-contractual
remedies.
C. The Settlement
Public Law 85-804 gave the Navy authority to settle Electric
Boat's claim. Public Law 85-80487 allows the Executive to grant ex-
traordinary contractual relief whenever "such action would facilitate
the national defense." 88 The government made its settlement with
Electric Boat under the residual powers of the statute. 9
Since Public Law 85-804 was essential to the outcome of the
claims settlement, this statute's history and use in the settlement
claims deserves exploration. The substantive provision of the stat-
ute states:
The President may authorize any department or agency of the Govern-
ment which exercises functions in connection with the national de-
fense, acting in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
President for the protection of the Government, to enter into con-
tracts or into amendments or modifications of contracts heretofore or
hereafter made and to make advance payments thereon, without re-
gard to other provisions of law relating to the making, performance,
amendment, or modification of contracts, whenever he deems that
such action would facilitate the national defense.90
were litigated-and "cost of litigation"-the Navy's estimate of the cost of attorneys'
fees, court costs, and other costs to litigate fully the claims. The Board placed the litiga-
tive risk at $20.2 million and the cost of litigation at $8.8 million. In other words, the
Board found an actual entitlement of $96 million; an additional $29 million was added
as risk insurance. Better Government Association, The Use of P.L. 85-804 (Extraordi-
nary Contractual Relief): Essential Aid or Bailout? 66 (1983).
87. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-35 (1982).
88. 50 U.S.C. § 1431.
89. Relief can also be granted "when an actual or threatened loss on a defense con-
tract, however caused, will impair the productive ability of a contractor whose continued
performance on any defense contract or whose continued operation as a source of sup-
ply is found to be essential to the national defense." FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 50.302-1 (1987).
However, few contractors qualify for relief under this standard. As one commentator
noted:
The doctrine of essentiality is catch-22. If you're big enough to be essential to the
defense effort, you're too big to need extraordinary relief. If you're small enough to
need extraordinary relief, you're not big enough to be essential.
Better Government Association, supra note 86, at 17.
90. 50 U.S.C. § 1431. Title II of the first War Powers Act, Pub. L. No. 354, 55 Stat.
839 (1941), was the predecessor to Public Law 85-804, and its authority was used to
facilitate the prosecution of World War II. Congress reactivated Title II on January 12,
1951, (Pub. L. No. 921,64 Stat. 1257) after President Truman declared a national emer-
gency during the Korean War. Congress extended Title II successively until 1957, when
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The legislative history does not provide specific guidance on what
constitutes "facilitating the national defense." The report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee simply observes:
The authority contained in this bill is not, therefore, authority by
which the departments and agencies of Government may dispense aid
solely for the benefit of contractors or subcontractors. While contrac-
tors or subcontractors may be recipients of aid in some instances, the
primary consideration is, and must be, whether such aid will facilitate
the national defense.
9'
This statute, as implemented by Executive Order 10,789,92 autho-
rizes the Department of Defense and other civilian agencies
9" to
grant relief to contractors "even though there is no legal obligation
to do so, and even if there is a legal prohibition against it."19 The
implementing regulations provide detailed guidance on relief
granted as a contractual adjustment, 95 but, in contrast, require only
that the action facilitate the national defense for relief granted
under the residual powers of Public Law 85-804.96 As long as the
relief is not "used in a manner that encourages carelessness and lax-
ity on the part of persons engaged in the defense effort" and is not
"relied upon when other adequate legal authority exists within the
agency,"'9 7 it may be granted "when necessary and appropriate, all
circumstances considered."98 These limitations seem not to con-
strain the practical application of Public Law 85-804. Furthermore,
Public Law 85-804 was enacted into permanent law. Although President Truman's
proclamation of national emergency was terminated on September 14, 1976, by Pub. L.
No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1651), Public Law 85-804 was
exempted. Thus, a national emergency still exists for purposes of extraordinary con-
tractual relief under Public Law 85-804.
91. S. Rep. No. 2281, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3 (1958).
92. Exec. Order No. 10,789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 (1958), as amended by Exec. Order
No. 11,051, 27 Fed. Reg. 9683 (1962), Exec. Order No. 11,382, 32 Fed. Reg. 16247
(1967), and Exec. Order No. 11,610, 36 Fed. Reg. 13755 (1971).
93. The civilian agencies are the Department of the Treasury, Department of the
Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Trans-
portation, Department of Energy, General Services Administration, National Aeronau-
tics and Space Administration, Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency, and the Government Printing Office.
94. Richardson, supra note 78, at 129.
95. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 50.3 (1987). References are to the current Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR), which have superceded the Defense Acquisition Regulations (DAR)
and the Armed Services Procurement Regulations (ASPR). The regulations implement-
ing Public Law 85-804 are substantially the same under all sets of regulations.
96. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 50.4 (1987). The residual powers are generally undefined.
97. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 50.102 (1987). This is intended to require the contractor to
exhaust all administrative remedies before relief under Public Law 85-804 can be made
available. Richardson, supra note 78, at 132 n.10.




executive branch decisions under Public Law 85-804 cannot be
appealed. 99
Although relief under Public Law 85-804 has been granted spar-
ingly for the most part,'00 large awards were made in 1978, when
the Navy provided almost $1 billion in relief to three shipyards, in-
cluding Electric Boat.' 0 ' The use of Public Law 85-804 to settle the
Navy shipbuilding claims has been criticized for (1) unnecessarily
increasing the bargaining power of contractors, (2) not subjecting
government contractors to the same ordinary rules of business as
the private sector, and (3) encouraging underbidding on con-
tracts.' 0 2 Public Law 85-804 was used specifically to avoid litigation
in the 1978 cases.' 0 3 One commentator in the Defense Department
observed: "[A]lthough these decisions could have been settled
under contractually-provided disputes mechanisms, the Secretary of
the Navy determined that the disputes process, although available,
was inadequate for the settlement of these large and complex
claims." 104
Congress, for the most part, accepted the use of Public Law 85-
804 as an instrument of compromise. It supported a settlement in
which both sides accepted some blame: the Navy would partially
bail out General Dynamics only if the company accepted an equal
99. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 50.202 (1987). Relief under 85-804 is within the discretion of
the executive departments and can not be compelled by court action. See Evans Reamer
& Machine Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 873 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 982 (1968).
100. From 1959 through 1977, only $133.1 million in awards were made under the
act, an average of $7 million a year, with the important exception of two awards totalling
$623 million to Lockheed in 1971 as part of the effort to prevent that contractor from
going bankrupt. Lockheed's awards included $500 million from the Air Force for losses
on the C-5A program, and $123 million from the Army for losses on the Cheyenne
helicopter program. Better Government Association, supra note 86, app. IV. Many of
the awards could not have been made if the standard of facilitating the national defense
had been strictly interpreted. For example, Public Law 85-804 has apparently been used
to provide relief to an advertising agency under contract to the Navy and to a soft drink
supplier for the Air Force that was struck by an unexpected rise in worldwide sugar
prices. See, e.g., Lane Sales Co., ACAB No. 1169 (Nov. 4, 1974); ACAB No. 1169A (Feb.
27, 1975), cited in Better Government Association, supra note 86, at 33-36.
101. Richardson, supra note 78, at 145. This amount included $23.2 million for
Newport News, $182 million for Litton, and $359 million for Electric Boat, which re-
ceived another $125 million from the Navy Claims Settlement Board. Better Govern-
ment Association, supra note 86, at 75, 79, 65.
102. See, e.g., Better Government Association, supra note 86, at 2, 27. While the first
two arguments have merit, the third argument, that the availability of relief under 85-
804 increases underbidding by contractors, may not be supported by subsequent evi-
dence, because there have been no major awards under Public Law 85-804 since the
settlement of the shipbuilding claims.
103. Richardson, supra note 78, at 145; Better Government Association, supra note
86, at 26.
104. Richardson, supra note 78, at 145. The author was attorney/advisor, Office of
Assistant General Counsel (Logistics), Office of Secretary of Defense.
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amount as a fixed loss.' 05 The Connecticut and Rhode Island con-
gressional delegations worked hard to put together a settlement that
would save the jobs of their constituents. 0 6 Only Senator William
Proxmire opposed the agreement, calling it "a form of backdoor
welfare" that rewarded the shipbuilders for their waste and misman-
agement and would establish a harmful precedent.
10 7
The settlement illustrates the failure of contract to regulate the
terms of the procurement relationship when the oligopolistic struc-
ture of the industry allocates disproportionate bargaining power to
the supplier and concerns of national security limit the freedom of
the buyer. In this example, the government considered the Los An-
geles class submarines an essential counter to the Soviet naval
buildup, and no other contractor was able to complete their con-
struction. The only other shipyard capable of building the ships was
already overburdened with its own submarine contracts. The combi-
nation of these extra-contractual forces put the Navy in a weak bar-
gaining position. Rather than setting the terms of the relationship,
the contract weakly constrained a relationship whose terms were re-
ally defined by more potent structural and political forces.
IV The $100 Million Insurance Claim Dispute
As part of the 1978 claims settlement, General Dynamics agreed
not to submit any additional contract claims to the Navy on work
that had already been completed on either the SSN-688 or Trident
class submarines.' 0 8 As a result, General Dynamics would have to
pay for the repair of any workmanship defects that the Navy might
later discover. One of the articulated purposes of this agreement
was to prevent the abuse of the "constructive changes" doctrine. 0 9
105. U.S. Representative George Mahon, chairman of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee told the Chairman of General Dynamics:
There are too many people who believe that you are partly responsible for this, and
nobody knows whether it's eighty percent or twenty percent or what, but this is an
election year and the Congress will not vote to bail you out for this large amount of
money. I have to tell you, you can count on our support provided you take a very
painful part of this.
Tyler, supra note 34, at 244.
106. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 154.
107. "The message the Navy is sending out is this," said Proxmire. "If you are a
large contractor and you dominate an important portion of the defense market, file an
inflated claim and the Navy will pay the true value plus as much as 50% of the remaining
portion." Id.
108. Better Government Association, supra note 86, at 65.
109. For a discussion of this doctrine, see supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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As a consequence of the agreement, the traditional legal remedy
used by contractors-relief under the constructive changes doc-
trine-was not available when workmanship defects were discovered
on the SSN-688 and Trident submarines late in 1979. However, be-
cause of the large amount of money and new submarine contracts at
stake, General Dynamics refused to abide by the terms of the agree-
ment and sought to shift the responsibility to the government.
Two major quality problems were discovered in submarines pro-
duced at Electric Boat. First, nonconforming steel had been used in
the construction of the submarines. Steel suppliers had been deliv-
ering unmarked substandard material for about nine years, and
shipyard employees, as well as Navy inspectors, had overlooked or
failed to act on shipping labels that described the metal's incorrect
chemical content."l 0 Second, in early 1980, Navy and Electric Boat
inspectors found thousands of welds either defective or missing al-
together. The shipyard's inspection force, whose system had failed
to report defective workmanship for many years, had improperly
certified the welds. Regardless of the extent of the defects, repairing
them would be costly and time consuming, thus effectively halting
production at the shipyard and further delaying the shipyard's deliv-
ery schedule."'
Resolving the quality control problems exacerbated the already
poor working relationship between Electric Boat and the Navy. The
Navy did not speak with one voice to its contractors. Inspectors
swarmed the Groton yard to check and certify that the quality con-
trol problems were being corrected. Meanwhile, Admiral Rickover,
whose legal authority covered only the nuclear propulsion system
aboard the submarine, tried to persuade Navy and Defense Depart-
ment officials that Electric Boat's faulty workmanship should dis-
110. The shipyard eventually determined that about 12% of the 6,126 tons of car-
bon steel that it had received between 1970 and 1979 was substandard. However, sub-
standard steel was a fairly common problem in the shipbuilding industry. A NAVSEA
quality insurance official had acknowledged in 1980 that 30% of the carbon steel bar
stock in the Navy's own shipyards and supply system was also nonconforming. Good-
win, supra note 24, at 287.
111. One account notes:
In a nuclear submarine, a suspicion of defect was as good as a defect because every-
thing had to be perfect. That's what the Navy had learned from the loss of U.S.S.
Thresher and her crew of one hundred twenty-seven men. You couldn't be 99 per-
cent sure that all the welds were there.
Tyler, supra note 34, at 259-60. On April 10, 1963, the U.S.S. Thresher and her crew
were destroyed by a leak that triggered the emergency shutdown of the nuclear reactor
and pulled the submarine below its crush depth only 100 miles off Cape Cod. Id. at 53-
54.
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qualify it from being awarded upcoming submarine contracts. 1 2
Electric Boat's rebuttal, provided by Takis Veliotis, the general
manager at the Groton shipyard, was adamant in denying the
charges. 1
3
To cover the high cost of the reinspection program, Electric Boat
announced that it intended to file up to $100 million in insurance
claims under the legal theory that builders' risk insurance protected
the shipyard from the poor performance of its own workers. Thus,
Electric Boat was asking the Navy to reimburse it for its own mis-
management. Since World War II, the Navy had prohibited private
shipyards from purchasing marine builders' risk insurance from
commercial underwriters and added the cost of the premiums, gen-
erally 2%, to the price of the contract. 1 4 The Navy had saved hun-
dreds of millions of dollars by insuring shipyards against "all risks"
of accidents, fires, floods, and other calamities. 1 5 General Dynam-
ics argued that a commercial insurance policy would cover all unfor-
seen production costs, even those attributable to the shipyard's
workers. 116
General Dynamics Chairman David Lewis viewed the insurance
claims as an asset that the company could use to increase its bar-
gaining power with the Navy. He admitted that "[the insurance
claims] just didn't seem right to me, but what's right in your mind,
as an exercise in logic, is not necessarily right under the law."" 17 A
recent $300 million recovery by a New Orleans shipyard against its
commercial underwriters for insulation that cracked during its con-
112. Goodwin, supra note 24, at 289.
113. Tyler, supra note 34, at 287-88.
114. Federal Securities Laws and Defense Contracting, Part 1: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, House Energy and Commerce Comm., 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1985) [hereinafter Hearings on Federal Securities Laws] (prepared
statement of General Dynamics Chairman David Lewis).
115. See Goodwin, supra note 24, at 294; Tyler, supra note 34, at 269.
116. Veliotis explained this legal theory to Congress:
If you have collision insurance on your new car and you get involved in an accident,
the insurance company will pay, regardless of whether or not the accident was your
fault. Similarly, if you fall asleep while smoking in bed and as a result your house
catches fire and burns down, your home owners insurance will pay, even though in
this example it is obvious that you were at fault .... When the government chooses
to go into the marine insurance business in order to save premium costs, that would
not change the result either-nor should it. The fact that the government became
underwriter should not deprive the insured of the coverage he would have had if
the underwriter had been a commercial insurance company.
Hearings on Federal Securities Laws, supra note 114, at 360.




struction of liquified natural gas tankers encouraged General Dy-
namics to pursue its claim."
t 8
Even more valuable to the company than insurance claims were
follow-on contracts, which could generate profits of more than $100
million, to build additional SSN-688 and Trident submarines. On
March 17, 1981, the new Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman, had
canceled the bid requests that had been sent to both Electric Boat
and Newport News for the three SSN-688 submarines provided for
in the 1980-81 budget. Lehman had decided to negotiate solely
with Newport News."t 9 In a letter to Lewis, Secretary Lehman justi-
fied the action, stating that "the award of these submarines to New-
port News is necessary in the interests of national defense so as to
have Newport News available as a supplier of SSN-688 submarines
at levels necessary in the case of national emergency."' 20 According
to one account, Lehman personally told Lewis that General Dynam-
ics would get no more submarine contracts from the Navy if it filed
insurance claims for poor workmanship. 12'
The feud escalated as, two weeks after Lehman's announcement
that Newport News would receive the contracts for the next three
SSN-688 submarines, Electric Boat manager Veliotis threatened to
decrease production from the required three ships per year to two
unless the Navy gave the yard more business. 122 Then in June, Gen-
eral Dynamics filed the first of its insurance claims against the Navy,
demanding $19.8 million for the cost of repairing the defective
welds and steel on the U.S.S. Bremerton. It announced that future
claims would be filed as additional ships were delivered. Secretary
Lehman objected strongly to the filings.' 23 He declared that the
Navy would consider General Dynamics' claims as it planned its fu-
ture submarine program, and would consider filing counterclaims
against the company, not only for direct damages caused by the
shipyard's construction delays, but also for any consequential dam-
ages incurred.
118. Hearings on Federal Securities Laws, supra note 114, at 20-2 1.
119. Former Navy Secretary Hidalgo, now advising General Dynamics, argued that
Lehman had lost all bargaining leverage over Newport News in awarding the subcon-
tracts on a sole source basis, and the Navy would end up paying more for its ships. Tyler,
supra note 34, at 301.
120. Id. at 285.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 290.
123. Lehman told the National Press Club, "The Department of Defense will not
tolerate such corporate attitudes. They are unacceptable. We will not subscribe to the
notion that the government always pays .. " Goodwin, supra note 24, at 296.
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By August, however, Lehman had decided that he needed to re-
solve the dispute with General Dynamics. Perhaps he realized that
his goal of a 600-ship navy was virtually unattainable if the Navy
continued to battle with its principal contractor. In October, Leh-
man and Lewis reached an agreement from which both sides could
claim victory. General Dynamics would be awarded three SSN-688
submarine contracts--one firm contract and two options-generat-
ing more than $100 million in additional profits and offsetting the
bulk of the company's loss from the quality control problems. In
exchange, the Navy's contracting officer would rule that the insur-
ance claims were not recoverable, and General Dynamics would
agree to withdraw the reimbursement request.'
24
For General Dynamics the price was right. The SSN-688 con-
tracts were awarded on the same terms that Newport News had re-
ceived.' 25 However, the contracts also provided for equal sharing of
cost risk, instead of the traditional 70-30 split under which the gov-
ernment picked up 70% of cost growth between the target and ceil-
ing prices. The contractors may have thought that this new
arrangement, with a higher base price, would allow them to "under-
run" the contract and split the underrun with the Navy on a 50-50
basis. But as of 1987, the General Accounting Office (GAO) was
projecting cost overruns of nearly $800 million for General Dy-
namic's remaining SSN-688 contracts. 126 According to the GAO,
overruns have nearly doubled on each SSN-688 contract awarded
since fiscal year 1981.127
The General Dynamics insurance claim illustrates the difficulties
of contractual risk distribution in weapons acquisition contracts.
Once the contract is awarded to a contractor on whom the govern-
ment feels dependent, other goals compete with efficient risk distri-
bution. The contractor here used the insurance claim as a
bargaining chip to gain leverage with the Navy. Secretary Lehman
believed he needed Electric Boat to achieve his goal of a 600-ship
navy and consequently was willing to pay the premium demanded
by the contractor. Ensuring the continuous construction of ships
124. Department of Defense Appropriations for 1983: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. on Department of Defense, House Appropriations Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
114-15 (1982) (statement of Vice Admiral Earl B. Fowler, Jr., Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command).
125. Hidalgo's warning about buying higher-priced ships on a sole source basis had
been correct. The new submarine contracts were restructured to set a higher ceiling
price.
126. GAO Report on Status of Claim Settlement, supra note 65, at 8.




took precedence over preserving an equitable allocation of risk be-
tween the government and its contractors. A Navy secretary with
different goals might have been willing to bear the political and eco-
nomic costs of litigating the claims with Electric Boat.
V. Conclusion and Recommendations
This Article has examined the role of contract and procurement
policies in the acquisition of the SSN-688 attack submarine. As the
contractual structure struggles to mediate between the dual needs
of stability and change, the political and economic environment of
defense contracting often fosters inflexibility, instability, and the
adoption of extra-contractual remedies.
A well-functioning procurement process should appropriately al-
locate risk between the contractor and the government. In addition,
it should not create incentives for the contractor to pursue extra-
contractual remedies. It is not possible to achieve these goals by
applying the same contract structure and procurement policies to all
weapons programs. The procurement process for each weapons
system should be carefully tailored to the program's specific
characteristics.
The case study of the SSN-688 procurement process is the basis
for several recommendations for improving the formulation, execu-
tion, and dispute resolution of weapons contracts. Briefly, the rec-
ommendations are as follows:
(1) Limit the use of fixed-price contracts when significant uncertain-
ties exist in specifications, cost, and performance.
(2) Involve the procurement contractor in the early stages of the de-
sign process.
(3) Utilize cost controls for constructive changes.
(4) Strengthen the authority of the contracting officer.
(5) Utilize alternative dispute resolution techniques as a method of
resolving some contract claims.
(6) Reduce the government's discretion in awarding extra-contrac-
tual relief under Public Law 85-804.
(7) Require "good faith" in the filing of insurance claims by
contractors.
A. Limit the Use of Fixed-Price Contracts
Many of the problems of the SSN-688 procurement process re-
sulted from the use of an inflexible fixed-price contract for the first
follow ship built by Electric Boat in 1971. A "cost-type" contract
would have caused fewer difficulties. After the claim settlement, As-
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sistant Secretary of the Navy Hidalgo conducted a study which con-
cluded that a fixed-price incentive contract would have been
appropriate only if "the contract design package [was] technically
sound and stable, the ship [was] not complex, and the shipbuilder's
project workload [was] stable."'' 28 If these conditions were not met,
the study recommended the initial use of a cost-plus contract, with a
transition to a fixed-price incentive contract as soon as the actual
costs of ship construction could be accurately predicted-presuma-
bly after the completion of the first ship. ' 29 This technique has been
used successfully in the acquisition of various major weapons
systems. 130
Where uncertainties in cost, technical specifications, and schedul-
ing are high, as in the construction of the lead ship or the first follow
ship by a follow contractor, a "cost-type transition" contract is more
appropriate. There is little to be gained by forcing the parties to
estimate the costs of such risks in a speculative fashion in order to
arrive at a fixed-price contract. Instead, the government should in-
sist on using a cost-type transition contract in which the contractor
accepts a lower profit in exchange for the government's assumption
of most of these risks.
Under a cost-type transition contract, work begins on a cost reim-
bursement basis, and the parties agree to negotiate a superseding
definitive fixed-price incentive contract upon resolution of the tech-
nical, cost, and schedule risks.' 3 ' The time of transition to a fixed-
price contract will vary from program to program. The contractor's
major incentive to make the transition early is the higher target
profit that can be negotiated for a fixed-price contract. 3 2 The gov-
ernment's major incentive is the determination of a more definitive
limit on the final cost of contract performance. Once the parties
adequately define and price the risks associated with construction of
the first follow ship, all subsequent follow ships awarded to that con-
tractor should use fixed-price incentive contracts.' 33
128. Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 178.
129. Id.
130, Id. at 138.
131. Under this arrangement, Electric Boat would have begun work on its first SSN-
688 before technical, cost, and schedule uncertainties had been resolved on the lead
ship contract at Newport News, without assuming the entire risk.
132. Of course, this incentive is more meaningful when the contract change process
is brought under control.
133. The Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition has recently criticized contin-
ued use of certain fixed-price contracts. Costello Memo on Fixed-Price Development




The uniformed Navy in Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA)
did not accept Hidalgo's proposal to use a cost-type transition con-
tract. NAVSEA feared that the shipbuilders might shift resources to
non-Navy work if they were not offered favorable contract terms.
NAVSEA also feared that the transition from a cost-type contract to
a fixed-price contract could result in disputes and lengthy litiga-
tion. 34 A Ship Acquisition Policy Advisory Council was formed to
reconcile the contrary views of NAVSEA and Assistant Secretary of
the Navy Hidalgo. The Council essentially acquiesced to NAVSEA's
view by suggesting that NAVSEA merely "consider" the use of cost-
type contracts when the contract risks cannot be "reasonably
priced." 3
5
The debate over the appropriate contract type continues. Defense
contractors and the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition seek
more limits on the use of fixed-price contracts, especially for devel-
opment contracts and for production contracts begun prior to the
completion of full-scale development. 3 6 But the Navy continues to
assert its preference for fixed-price contracts. 137 Although the De-
partment of Defense is slowly reversing this controversial policy, the
dispute over contract type remains unresolved.
B. Involve the Contractor in the Design Process
One important way to minimize costly construction changes is to
involve the contractor in the early stages of the weapon design pro-
cess' 3 8 so that the design can be tailored to the resources that the
134. Memorandum of the Ship Acquisition Policy Advisory Council, Final Council
Action on Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, Conclusion No. 5.3.2., Contract
Types for Follow Ships, Nov. 28, 1979 (on file with author).
135. Id.
136. In a memorandum dated Dec. 23, 1987, Robert B. Costello, Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition, set forth the policy opposing the use of fixed-price contracts for
development. Costello Memo on Fixed-Price Development Contracting, supra note 133.
See also Ad Hoc Industry Advisory Comm., Subcomm. on Defense Industry and Technol-
ogy, Senate Comm. on Armed Services, Report to the Subcomm. on Defense Industry
and Technology on Acquisition Policy, at B-I l (Feb. 5, 1988) [hereinafter Report on
Acquisition Policy].
137. Under the guidance of Secretary Lehman, the Navy attempted to expand its use
of fixed-price contracts, even requiring that contracts for research and development-
the phase of greatest uncertainty in weapons acquisition-be fixed-price. Secretary of
the Navy, SecNav Instruction 4210.6, Nov. 20, 1985 (on file with author). A Navy official
has indicated that even though the service will comply with the more recent policy man-
date towards cost-type contracts, the Navy will seek "waivers" in cases where a fixed-
price contract is preferred. Navy Reviews Rule on Fixed-Price Development Con-
tracting, Aerospace Daily, Mar. 22, 1988, at 437.
138. Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, supra note 19, at 261. Changes in speci-
fications during the procurement of major weapons systems are inevitable. As this case
shows, some specifications must be changed during the construction process, especially
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contractor will use to build the ship. Also, the design documenta-
tion should be easy for the contractor to understand and to use.
The better the documentation is during the design phase, the less
likely there will be changes during the construction phase. If the
ship designer and the ship builder work together during the design
process, these important design goals can be achieved, and conse-
quently, excess construction changes can be minimized.
C. Utilize Cost Controls for Constructive Changes
The focus in seeking to control the costs of changes should be on
questionable constructive changes that contractors claim were
caused by government-ordered changes to which the additional
work is only indirectly related. Several actions are possible. First, as
suggested by the Naval Ship Procurement Process Study, the gov-
ernment should include in all contracts a provision that denies con-
tractors any recovery for indirect costs incurred where failure of
notice, after the contractor knew or should have known of the prob-
lem, deprives the government of the opportunity to solve the prob-
lem and save costs.' 3 9 Second, contracting officers must avoid
creating constructive changes by adhering to contract terms too me-
ticulously. Finally, the government can perform "should-cost" stud-
ies 140 on major contract changes, such as those costing over
$50,000. Such analyses might also be useful as baselines for deter-
mining how much the government should pay for other changes.
D. Strengthen the Authority of the Contracting Officer
Strengthening the authority of the contracting officer is another
step that will reduce the frequency and cost of contract changes.
The increasingly large roles played by auditors and other specialists,
such as small business advisors, have eroded the authority and con-
tinuity of the contracting officer.14' While the functions performed
on the first ship in the yard. The goal is not to eliminate all changes, but to reduce their
number and improve their processing.
139. Id. at 262.
140. "Should-cost" studies are estimates based on analyses of a contractor's price
proposal in which experts examine the assumptions made by the contractor and the
manner in which the proposed price is constructed. A should-cost analysis enables the
government to negotiate with the contractor to determine the lowest reasonable price.
Fox, supra note 7, at 156.
141. A 1987 report of the Public Contract Law Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion examined their role:
The role of the DoD contracting officer is changing from the traditional to a less
well-defined position of diminished significance and shared authority ... [Tihe cur-




by these specialists are important, they are not a substitute for the
contracting officer's authority and accountability. The diffusion of
authority between contracting officer and auditor leads to less ac-
countability and to inadequate oversight of the procurement pro-
cess. The decisionmaking authority of the contracting officer in
audit matters should be preserved, with the auditor acting as a key
advisor to the contracting officer.142 In this way, the contracting of-
ficer is both responsible and accountable for contract changes.
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E. Utilize Alternative Dispute Resolution Techniques
The government should consider using Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution (ADR) techniques to resolve contract claims on large
procurements such as the SSN-688s. The U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers has introduced a number of such methods to resolve its con-
tract claims. 144 In a number of cases it has used a structured
settlement process called "minitrials" in which each side presents a
highly abbreviated summary of its case before senior officials of
both sides. The officers are usually high-level officials who have full
authority to settle the dispute and who have not previously been
involved in the case. Following the presentation, the officers seek to
negotiate a settlement.'
45
Another ADR technique is the creation of an independent, neu-
tral panel to hear the arguments of each party on a case-by-case ba-
sis. The panel could be composed of lawyers and experts in the
subject matter of the dispute. Their "opinion" would provide the
basis for a settlement.
and regulations... Such diffusion of authority can only mean a diminished role for
the contracting officer which, extended to the ultimate conclusion, will result in no
identifiable Government official at the operating level being responsible for efficient
contracting practices or accountable for contracting failures.
Ad Hoc Comm. on the Role of the DoD Contracting Officers, The DoD Contracting
Officer, 1987 A.B.A. Sec. Pub. L. Rep. 93, cited in Report on Acquisition Policy, supra
note 136, at B-15.
142. Id. Congress took a step toward re-establishing the contracting officer's author-
ity in 1986 when it directed the Secretary of Defense to develop a "plan for a personnel
initiative designed to enhance the professionalism of, and career opportunities available
to, acquisition personnel of the Department of Defense." Department of Defense Au-
thorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-661, § 932, 1985 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.
News (99 Stat.) 3816, 3940.
143. See Report on Acquisition Policy, supra note 136, at B-14.
144. Crowell & Pou, Appealing Government Contract Decisions: Reducing the Cost
and Delay of Procurement Litigation, A Report to the Administrative Conference of the
United States 14 (Jan. 1988) (on file with author).
145. Id. at 13.
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ADR offers many ways to create a resolution process that is tai-
lored to the needs of a particular case. 146 The use of such a method
in the SSN-688 case might have produced a less controversial and
more generally accepted settlement. The government has been
slow to recognize that these creative solutions offer the possibility of
resolving such disputes both equitably and without the traditional
lengthy and costly judicial process.
F. Reduce Discretion to Award Extra-Contractual Relief Under Public
Law 85-804
The President's discretion in establishing the amount of relief
under Public Law 85-804 is probably greater than warranted to "fa-
cilitate the national defense." At least two steps should be taken to
reduce the discretion available in making awards under Public Law
85-804. First, procedural rules regarding the submission of evi-
dence and discovery should be promulgated. At present, the de-
partment seeking relief determines on an ad hoc basis the
supporting evidence required for a request for relief. Establishing
uniform standards on the submission of evidence would ensure that
appropriate documentation supported the decision. Second, no re-
lief should be afforded to firms that are under active investigation
for fraud or have been indicted on criminal charges related to the
government contracts for which relief is requested. 47 If this rule
had been in effect during the SSN-688 procurement process, Gen-
eral Dynamics would have been ineligible for extra-contractual relief
because it was under investigation for contract fraud. 148
G. Require "Good Faith" Filing of Insurance Claims by Contractors
To prevent contractors from using the threat of a builders' risk
insurance claim on government-underwritten insurance to obtain
benefits beyond the terms of the contract, the Navy should add a
"good faith" requirement to its insurance coverage. Under such a
policy, claims against the government could not include recovery for
the contractor's own negligence. In addition, the Navy should add a
provision that would limit its coverage of unforeseen production
146. However, the use of ADR should not diminish the authority of the contracting
officer to manage the change order process and to minimize the need to seek alternative
dispute resolution forums.
147. This rule is analogous to the equitable principle of "clean hands."
148. In 1982, the Justice Department announced that it had collected insufficient





costs to those not attributable to the contractor's deliberate actions.
The contractor should bear the risk for the shoddy workmanship of
its own employees.
This Article has addressed instances in which contract and pro-
curement policies have created particularly egregious problems in
the weapons acquisition process. Of course, contractual improve-
ments and policy changes should not be seen as a panacea for all
problems of weapons acquisition. Many dimensions of the acquisi-
tion process, such as management, organization, and budget, can-
not be addressed solely through the instrument of contract.
However, it is important to understand how the problems -created
by procurement contracts and policies affect the course of major
weapons systems acquisitions in order to improve the process in the
future.
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